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The concepts of "immanence" and "transcendenee" have
long lineage in the history of Western metaphysies.1The names
of Plato and Aristotle stand for two diverging tendencies that
have placed the realm of truest reality-the Ideas or
Essences-either outside or within the world. But when it eomes
to the question of how one is to know or eommunieate the
spiritualand the sensua4 such elear distinetions beeome blurred.
The strategie approach that has led thinkers to insist upon
immanence can be easily eharaeterised: it has always been a
question of revealing the theological motivations that linger in
outer-worldly experienee. At the same time, emphasizing
immanence means collapsing the hierarchical order-whether
cosmological or political-that is traditionally rooted in the
idea of the One. The tlunking of immanenee-as the counter-
concept to transcendence-is thus connected in a particular
and exemplary way to I<.ant and to the projeet of
Enlightenment.
The thesis that I wish to develop here asserts the
relevance and rightness of an immanent philosophy, a philosophy,
therefore, that is critical of transcendence and metaphysics. After
some introduetory observations, I will explain in more detail
how the problem relates to Kant. This will reveal that talk of
a simple opposition between immanence and transcendenee
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is not satisfactory because safeguarding the in1manent use
of reason necessarily requires excluding the unknowable
realm of transcendence. The world of immanence thus
appears to "us (finite) beings" as but a fraction of the world
in itself. The phenomenon whereby both concepts
con1plement each other shows the complexity of what is at
stake here. To put it in simple terms, we might say that
immanence is not thought radically enough as long as it
remains necessary or possible to separate it from arealm of
transcendence as a meaningful instance (an instance which
is considered to occasionally intervene in the world ex
machina).
In two further steps, I will draw on the work of Martin
Heidegger (1889-1976) and the French philosopher Gilles
Deleuze (1925-1995). Both these trunkers emphasize the claim
to immanence by thinking through what I have just described
as the phenomenon of their complementarity. They carry
out an ontological appropriation of layers of experience,
whose opacity (which cannot be revealed by traditional
philosophical means) grants a relative advantage to the
transcendental thinker in comparison to the scientific
philosopher who soberly insists on the immanence qua
verifiability of empirical knowledge. While Heidegger at this
point creates a new mystery surrounding the experience of
Being, Deleuze succeeds in locating every postulate of
transcendence "on the level of immanence," that is, on the
level of our concrete involvement in the world.
I would like to begin by tracing some of the major
historical steps in the development of the concepts of
immanence and transcendence. The concept of immanence
was first established in the work of the meclieval scholastics
Duns Scotus and William of Ockl1am. Drawing on Aristotle's
distinction between acting and creating, these thinkers
conceived of "God and His effect wruch is identical with His
Being" as an immanent activity-an activity that is limited,
however, to the activity of understancling. What is importan
here is that immanence is not oriented against a divin
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transcendent position, but is conceived as a form of
manifestation (not in the sense of worldly expression, but in
the sense of a spiritual being-with-itself).2Secondly, this aspect
was further developed in the works of Spinoza, for whom
substance becomes the immanent cause of all things. The
thesis of a God turned away from the world or of a God
who creates the world, emerges as the vision of an abstract
magnitude which cannot be explained, and therefore cannot
be comprehended. Thirdly, I<ant's transcendental dialectic in
the Critique of Pure Reason marks an historical turning point.
Kant reduces reason to its immanent use and thus distances
himself from previous n10dels of speculative argumentation,
which under the sign of a metaphysica specialis claimed to be
able to explain the existence of God or the immortality of
the Soul. Fourthly, in the context of German Idealism,
following I<ant, the principle of immanence is applied to the
totality of knowledge of the "absolute I:' which concentrates
on itself and its history. In a fifth step, in the course of the
nineteenth-century, this realm of immanent truth (the absolute
I, or what Hegel calls Spirit) is limited as a result of scientific
positivism.3 This explains, sixthly, the popularity of certain
forms of rhetoric which have attempted to resist the prevailing
"immanent status" whether it be of the Spirit, of History, of
the ruling classes or of instrumental reason (in the name of a
transcendent). To name but one example here: Jean-Paul
Sartre's book L'imaginaire: Psychologie phenomenologique de
l'imagination (1940) interprets the "intentionality" of
consciousness as a transcendent phenomenon and plays it
against the empiricist "illusion" of immanence.4 According to
Sartre, the empiricists failed to acknowledge the fundamental
characteristic of experience, which is that consciousness
overcomes itself towards something outside of itself.
Conceived as a U-topia of social relations and not as a correlate
of something defined by intentional-psychological or quasi-
anthropological Eactors, this "outside" plays an analogous role
in Neo-Marxist contexts as the transcendent vanishing point
oE descriptions of the present (the Idea oE Freedom).
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I
But let us now return to IZant. It is generally assumed that
with IZant, and with the critical turn he brought about in
philosophy, the end oE the ontological-contemplative era was
announced and a new era of logical-reflection or a philosophy
of consciousness began. Kant's project, as described in the
Critique of Pure Reason, is to make metaphysics Eace its own
limitations so that the incessant and fierce disputes between
the various successors oE the scholastics could finally be settled
by a higher judge-a project that is realised by the fixing oE
boundaries oE knowledge, which can only be trespassed
unlawfully. Reason is thus prevented from slipping into the
supernatural. It is forced to subordinate itselE to the scientific
request oE understandability and empirical verifiability and
must therefore lower its expectations to the intellectual
satisEaction of its naturally valid metaphysical needs. In fact,
Kant's critical development towards a metaphysics oE nature,
which reveals itselE as a science, aims to dissolve the
unavoidable task oE pure reason whose field of inquiry goes
beyond the limitation oE experience.
These unavoidable problems of mere pure
reason are God,Jreedom [of will], and immortaliry.
Tl1e science which, with all its preliminaries,
has for its especial object the dissolution
[AuJlö'sung] of these problems is named
metaphysics - a science which is at the very
outset dogmatical, that is, it confidently takes
upon itselE the execution oE this task without
any previous investigation of the ability or
inability oE reason for such an undertaking.5
"Dissolution" in this context can mean two things: on the
one hand, that tasks are resolved or questions answered, and
on the other hand, that the tasks are revealed to be false or
the questions wrongly posed. Kant chooses amiddIe way
when, in the Transcendental Dialectic, he declares that there
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can be both a legitimate and illegitimate use of Ideas. In fact,
reason becomes tangled up in paralogisms and antinomies
when it "confidently" sets off to recognize the absolute. In
accordance with their dogmatically conceived nature, the ideas
do not belong to an immanent but to a transcendent usage; they
amount therefore to false or incorrectly grounded problems.
Thus, in the appendix to the "Transcendental Dialectic," IZant
writes:
For it is not the idea in itself, but only the
employment of the idea in relation to possible
experience, that is transcendent or immanent.
An idea is employed transcendently, when it
is applied to an object falsely believed to be
adequate with and to correspond to it;
immanently, when it is applied solely to the
employment of the understanding in the
sphere of experience.6
Reason cannot relate immediately to its object, but can do so
only by way of the understanding, that is, by bringing the
already-determined knowledge of the understanding into a
systematic and at the same time problematic order.7 Bearing in
mind its incapacity for intellectual contemplation, metaphysical
reason must thus limit itself. Although reason cannot be
prevented from bringing up transcendent ideas, in its regulative
scientific use, it must be careful not to overstep the boundaries
of the mundus sensibilis.
Of course, the duty of theoretical reason to operate
within the boundaries of possible experience is based on the
assumption that reason is capable of defining those
boundaries. According to IZant, reason proves itself up to
this task by being able to pass a synthetic judgement apriori,
which defines the subjective legalities that function as the
necessary conditions for any possible experience of things.
By emphasizing subjectivity as a foundational instance, IZant
refers to his own critical innovation of metaphysics as a
transcendental philosophy-albeit at the cost of the synthetic
and singular character of theoretical judgements of reason.
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And a high price it is, because it comes witl1 the
"progressive independence of different rationality complexes,"
so that reason is reduced to being a capacity amongst others
and furthermore can only save its autonomy by withdrawing
from the world oE experience.8 As a result, in the context oE
the first critique, reason transfers its power to the
understanding, which as the originator of experience only
recognizes what corresponds to its own constitution and the
subjective pure forms of conten1plation. For Kant this is
indeed a curtailing "only," because under such critical
conditions it is no longer possible to recognize or classify the
being of a being in itself. Transcendental philosophy thus
presents itself as a shrunken form of generalmetaphysics, even
though it may still be related to some kind of special
metaphysics.
The project of the Kantian enlightenment was largely
successful where it was able to demonstrate the dogmatic
ambitions oE the rational systems of scholastic metaphysics,
such as, in accordance Witl1 Wolffian categorizations, assertions
about existence that went beyond the realm of rational ideas.
His transcendental philosophy proved itself as a limitative or
immanent theory insoEar as it established boundaries oE
experience beyond which no reasonable judgements were to
be possible. As a metaphysics of metaphysics, transcendental
philosophy was thus constituted through reflection on the
limits of finite knowledge. Metaphysics was introduced as the
science oE the general, the unchangeable, and the necessary;
in its mentalistically reduced form, it remains a theory of
consciousl1ess, which determines apriori the necessary
subjective conditions for the objectivity of general synthetic
judgements.
The question nevertheless arises as to whether and to
what extent metaphysically-burdened assumptions implicitly
enter into the IZantian conception. In his Treatise on Method,
Kant goes about the task, "of preparing a firm foundation
for those majestic edifices [of metaphysics as science]. For
this foundation has been hitherto insecure from the many
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subterranean passages which reason in its confident but vain
search for treasures has made in all directions."9 We may doubt
whether I<.ant's discovery of the transcendental really prepares
the ground for a safe and steady science, or whether it does
not instead pave the way for a "cave landscape" (Deleuze) of
underground labyrinthine tunnels.
A metaphysics that takes special care not to misuse
reason in a superficial or transcendent way conceives of itself,
in I<.ant's words, as a "metaphysics of metaphysics."10 With
its critical theses, it meets with wide approval, particularly with
regard to the fact that essences that cannot be identified as
belonging to the realm of subjectively founded and accessible
experience must consequently be regarded as unguaranteed
speculations, and which remain philosophically questionable
with regard to their truth value. What remains problematic
however (and already was so for first generation readers) is
the way in which the boundary between the realms of
immanence and transcendence is drawn-for instance, in the
case of Kant, the way in which the world of experience is
reduced to a dualistically conceived world of appearance which
cannot be defined ontologically. What will emerge is that the
judgement of the metaphysical element within critical
philosophy essentially depends on whether Kant's positive
explication of experience as en1.pirical knowledge-which he
carries out in his transcendental aesthetics and analytics-
can itself get away without relating to transcendent
assumptions, in other words, whether it proceeds purely
immanently. In an attempt to show how a philosophy of
difference is interested in radicalizing the critique, in what
follows I will first refer to some thoughts by Heidegger and
then to Deleuze.
11
Heidegger's connection with and continuation of I<.ant's
critical enterprise stands under the sign of a forced
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metaphysics of ftniteness. In his book entitled Kant and the
Problem of Metaphysics (1929),11 Heidegger approaches "I<.ant's
teachings of schematism and time as preliminary stages oE a
problematic oE temporality," as announced in the Eirst
paragraph oE the second part of Being and Time (1927).12
According to him, proEound sketches oE a metaphysics oE
Dasein Eounded in time are to be Eound within transcendental
analytics, especially in the context of his A-deduction and
the chapter on schematism. Heidegger suggests that behind
the school-like metaphysical fa~ade oE the epistemological
consolidation oE the natural sciences_harbours a new attempt
to found ontology.13 He recognizes in the I<.antian teaching
of transcendental imagination the temporal structures oE
human being-in-the-world (ontological structures oE
'lranscendence"), albeit at a preliminary stage. In the final
paragraph he sums it up as Eollows:
It is not because time Eunctions as 'Eorm of
intuition' and was interpreted as such at the
point of entry into the Critique of Pure Reason,
but because the understanding of Being must
be projected upon time Erom out oE the
ground of the finitude of the Dasein in n1.an,
that time, in essential unity with the
transcendental power oE imagination, attained
the central metaphysical function in the Critique
of Pure Reason. This itselE thus rattles the
mastery oE reason and the understanding.
'Logic' is deprived oE its pre-eminence in
metaphysics, which was built up Erom ancient
times.14
Unlike Hegel, Heidegger does not aim to reinstate the primacy
oE logic in metaphysics. His rejection oE the "point oE view
oE consciousness" does not refer to a dialectical relation
between essence and appearance. In order to infiltrate (not
suspend) Kant's dualism, following Husserl's method of
reduction, Heidegger adopts the strategy of a radical
finalization of the understanding oE Being. In other words,
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he relies on an ontologization of the experience of
phenomena.
Heidegger thus goes both beyond and behind I<ant.
His placing of finitude at the centre of critical philosophy in
the reception of the subject leads him back to ontology, on
the one hand, and away from postulating the thing-in-itself
on the other. In his book on Kant, Heidegger interprets the
transcendental syntheses developed in Kant's Analytic
(apprehension, reproduction and recognition) as syntheses
of time, which, before all concrete knowledge-but within
experience-develop their ontological patterns. These
patterns are not just abstract components of an intellectually
conceived wholeness of experience, which can be
reconstructed retrospectively. Rather, they have to do with a
phenomenological anticipation of the infamous "Ereignis"
(event of appropriation) that distinguishes itself structurally
from any experience conceived according to the
representational model.
Let us pause for amoment, and take things a little slower.
To begin with, we can hold on to the fact that Heidegger
conceives of temporality as the decisive dimension of the
transcendental because it is what constitutes the pre-existent
structures of the possible givenness of something-the
letting-be-present of Being. That anything affects us, that we
encounter anything at all which we are not-this fundamental
characteristic of the final human existence is what Heidegger
calls transcendence. Transcendence thus does not refer here to
an overcoming of immanently available empirical facts. On
the contrary, Heidegger uses the term to define the
fundamental structures of every possible experience-in the
sense of an openness of existence towards otherness. (This
is analogous to the characteristics of Dasein's ecstasy, which
because of its temporal constitution "stands outside of itself").
On this point Heidegger's terminology differs from I<ant's in
a remarkable way. For while Heidegger endeavours to define
the transcendental (qua ontological) structures of the
transcendence (of Dasein), Kant identifies a qualitative
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difference between the realms of transcendence and the
transcendental.15 In a word, IZant defines transcendentallogic
as an immanent logic of en1pirical knowledge and thus
distances himself from speculative logic, which, despite the
limits of human understanding, wanders into the metaphysical
realms of transcendence.
But does this mean that IZant is a thinker of immanence
and Heidegger a thinker of transcendence? This question
cannot be answered so simply because neither thinker uses
the concepts in the same way. At this point it may make sense
to apply to the relationship between Heidegger and IZant the
previously claimed thesis of immanence as an index for the
"truthfulness"-I use the Nietzschean term "Redlichkeif'-
of philosoph.y. In two steps, this aspect of their relation ought
to become clearer. First!y, Heidegger complies with a demand
for immanence when 11e insists on the finitude of the human
being and extends the primacy of finitude to the understanding
of Being as such. The temporal condition is a irreducible factor
of all experience-and it is indeed problematic how, on the
basis of reason's unlimited claim to truth, IZant distinguishes
arealm of immanence as a world of appearance from another
realm that stands under the sign of transcendence. This
distinction relates furthermore (a) to a securing of t11e necessity
and general validity of empirical knowledge, (b) to the
guarantee of a systematic and consistent order of experience
that is communicated by means of a regulative application of
the Ideas, and (c) to the maintaining of the traditional position
of reason as the protector of truth by means of its
autonomously carried out self-limitation. To summarize, this
means that implicit premises are involved in the IZantian
concept of experience which relate to the epistemological
distinction of experience, to its totality and undiminished
assertive claim. Kant's withdrawalfrom and reftrence to arealm
of being-in-itself-which is inaccessible to finite subjectivity
yet at the same time implicitly assumed-defines one of the
essential conditions of the concept of experience. Reason's
necessarily unfailing ability to self-differentiate makes up for
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its helplessness with regard to epistemological questions and
thus legitimates philosophy as the transcendental foundation
of all individual sciences.
We come now to the second step, which concerns
Heidegger's critical attitude towards metaphysics in its relation
to the latent metaphysical implications of IZant's concept of
experience. The fact that these implications perhaps include
transcendence relations-understood as relations that are not
identifiable as being within the immanence ofexperience (and
that therefore expose Kant's concept of experience to a forced
immanent critique)-this fact is easily misunderstood in the
context of Heidegger's concept of transcendence. It is
important to proceed here with care. First of all, it can
generally be said that Heidegger's critique of IZant culminates
in his critique of "representative thinking." Although already
in the .1920s Heidegger had turned away from the abstract
idea of a pure subject that confronts a world of given things,
it is only in the course of his general rejection of the tradition
oE metaphysics at the end oE the 1930s that the destruction
of "subjectivism" really becomes effective. Whereas in his
book on IZant, Heidegger is still trying to detect philosophical
preliminaries to his fundamental ontology in between the
lines of certain passages in the Critique of Pure Reason, later on
he becomes more sceptical. To put it bluntly, while in 1929
Heidegger still believed he could interpret transcendental
imagination as an inscrutable capacity of temporality, his later
readings bring IZant's primacy of understanding clearly to the
foreground. In the eyes of the later Heidegger, the idea of
Being as that which develops within syntheses of time,
independently of hasty patterns of interpretation, seems to
be totally missing in Kant's thought. This is clearly apparent
in the fact that Heidegger-for instance, in his 1940 Nietzsehe
lectures on modern European nihilism-considers subject and
object to be necessary starting conditions for IZant's
understanding of experience, and therefore no longer the
results of pre-existent synthetic processes of time.
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Briefly, when it comes to Heidegger's later critique,
it is important to mention bis criticism of onto-theology. Tbis
refers to the fact that Heidegger also criticises I<'ant for holding
on to theological surrogates in bis transcendental pbilosophy.
The most important of these surrogates is the logic of
grounding that "provides a reason" for experience, that
stipulates categorial possibilities for experience, wbich manifest
themselves per se in the unified subjective act of apperception.
Experience is thus assigned to conditions wbich restrictively
regulate its possibilities and at the same time dissimulate the
genetic process of experience that is not subjectively
controllable with regard to apriori unchanging entities such as
subject, object, concepts, and pure forms of perception.
According to Heidegger tllis cements the forgetting of
Being-in other words the destiny of Western History-and
tbis, for both Heidegger and I<.ant, means the destiny of world-
bistory in general.
Another word now about the guiding concept of
immanence. As already mentioned, I am orienting myself
according to I<.ant's idea of an immanent experience that is
not contaminated by a transcendent use of reason. At the
same time however, Heidegger's I<.ant readings show that I<.ant
bimself does not remain faithful to tbis principle. It is indeed
impossible to confirm I<.ant's idea of experience from the
theoretical position of immanence. Tbis is not the place to
carry out the necessary critique to reveal a logical inconsistency
in Kant's demonstration, i.e., in bis deductive steps. I<.ant's
concept of experience is conceived tautologically-and I<.ant
definitely reflects upon this structure. Nevertheless Kant's
assumed fact of experience certainly lacks phenomenological
plausibility.16 Indeed, in Kant's eyes the empirical fact of an
experience that is not categorially formed, but appropriable
by a subject, is impossible. All kinds of clinical, aesthetic,
religious or minority-group experiences are thus systematically
excluded. (Perhaps we should even point out that the
phenomenon of the sublime, which Kant analyses in the
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Critique of Judgement, is incompatible with the concept of
experience as laid out in the Critique of Pure Reason, or at
least calls to be revised).
But wl~at is true of Kant is also true of Heidegger's
concept of transcendence. When towards the end of the
1930s, Heidegger distances himself from the project of
metaphysics, from subjectivism, and also from Kant, he is
also distancing hirnself from his own earlier opinions that
were still largely oriented along IZantian lines. This is most
apparent in the Introduction (1949) and Epilogue (1943) that are
included in later editions of the lecture What is Metaphysics
(1929).17
In accordance with the idea of an immanent approach
to the process-character of being, the positing of an "I" as
the centre of activity which must overcome itself to reach
the other constitutes in itself a transcendent position.18 It
presumes the existence of an already given subject that relates
to other already constituted objects, and the way in which
trus occurs is conceived as a secondary phenomenon (that
can be reconstructed in a subject-object relation). But
Heidegger argues precisely against this kind of assumption in
his critique of onto-theology, in which he characterizes the
realm in between (namely, the "belonging together of Being
and Thought") as a primary phenomenon, which is to be
conceived as existing before its possibility that is rettospectively
anchored in the subject.
Now for Heidegger, the turning away from an imaginary
thinking goes hand in hand with a turning away from the
world that is structurally detern~ined in the 'Ge-Stell," that is,
in the primacy of technology. And it is precisely here that
Heidegger's thinking in turn fails to live up to the claim of
immanence. Indeed, Heidegger seems to hope that his turn
towards a concept of Being beyond worldly occurrences will
lead to an escape from the dilemma of a present that is
increasingly dominated by science and technology. And thus,
the opposition between transcendence and the immanent
connections of a technologically administrated world is
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Irepeated onee again. Transeendenee presents itself as a haven
of freedom and enlightenment, while immanenee on the other
hand is a plaee of darkness and eonfusion.19
In eontrast to the "Gnostieism" of Heidegger's
teaehings on Being,20 we may draw on a modern philosophy
of differenee inspired by Nietzsehe, namely the philosophy
of Gilles Deleuze, who eonstantly and throughout all his
writings referred to a thinking of immanenee. In Qu'est-ce que
la philosophie (1991) Deleuze, in eollaboration with Felix
Guattari, writes:
Immanenee ean be said to be the burning issue
of all philosophy beeause it takes on all the
dangers that philosophy must eonfront, all the
eondemnations, perseeutions, and
repudiations that it undergoes. This at least
persuades us that the problem of immanenee
is not abstract or merely theoretieal. It is not
immediately elear why immanenee is so
dangerous, but it is. It engulfs sages and gods.
What singles out the philosophers is the part
played by immanenee or fire [la part de
I'immanence) ou la part du ftu]. Immanence is
immanent only to itself and consequently
eaptures everything, absorbs All-One, and
leaves nothing remaining to whieh it eould be
immanent. In any ease, whenever immanenee
is interpreted as immanent 10 Something, we
can be sure that this Something reintroduees
the transeendent.21
Immanent proeesses of beeoming that are thought in terms
of a radieal empiricism give rise to relatively stable entities,
for instanee forms of subjeetifieation or experienee, that are
eonstituted through habits. But as soon as these entities are
eoneeived as independendy existing unities, they are detaehed
from the realm of immanenee. They then stand as
transeendent instanees above the proeessual eharaeter of
reality and are separated from their own genetie eonditions.
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A philosophy that is based on transcendent instances
considers these instances to be fundamental (i.e., pre-existent)
to the realm of immanence, so that in the end immanence
can no longer be thought as something that is self-structured,
but as something that is subordinate to the presumed
necessary poles of transcendence. Thus it becomes clear that
Deleuze actually combines together I<.ant's thinking of
immanence and Heidegger's critical onto-theology.
Experience is thus conceived as immanent when it is no longer
geared to a transcendent instance, neither with regard to a
stable subject, nor with regard to an outer-worldly being that
is determined from above by the fate of the world.
111
Giiles Deleuze first made a name for himself as an interpreter
of Nietzsehe and Bergson, and later as the co-author (with
Felix Guattari) ofAnti-Oedipus (1972) and A Thousand Plateaus
(1980). More recently he has been known as a philosopher of
film. Somewhat less known are his very original drafts of a
philosophy of immanence as laid out in the books Difference
and Repetition (1968) and The Logic of Sense (1969).22 In both
these books Deleuze develops the concept of philosophy that
underlies ail his other major works (inclucling his books on
Nietzsche, I<.ant, Bergson and Spinoza as weil as Foucault
and Leibniz).23 It is also fundamental to his more popular
"aesthetic" and political works (inclucling those written in the
early 1960s). In fact, looking at French post-war philosophy
in general, one could say that there has been no other writer
who has developed so consistent and positive a thinking of
clifference. From a philosophical perspective, he can be closely
related to Foucault, even though Deleuze presents himself
less as an historical philosopher and more as someone who
works conceptual!J in an attempt to establish a new kind of
thinking oriented along the lines of immanence. Deleuze does
not stand in any way for a negative metaphysics, which would
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content itself with pursuing a traditional logocentrism ad
absurdum. On the contrary, he attempts to deliver a
philosophical theory for the "thought of the outside" that
Foucault called for, and which makes a new beginning with
difference. It is no wander, then, that a determining criterion
of actuality for a philosophy of imnianence lies in its
appropriateness as an instrument for the analysis of power.
But immanence thinking is by no means only relevant in
political contexts. In what follows I will concentrate on same
philosophical aspects of Deleuze's ontology, his theory of
tinie, and his analysis of power.
My first point is this: Ontology generally seems to be a
discipline of the past. This is because, according to I<.ant,
every conscious attempt to define being objectively is suspect
of being uncritical or "pre"-critical. Even Hegel reflected on
this connection (even in the context of arehabilitation of
ontology) when he insisted on "substance becoming subject."
The problem of ontology is further complicated by Heidegger.
In his thinking, it is precisely ontological access that Being
eludes-and it is precisely this elusive character of Being that
calls for a different kind of thinking and a different ontology.
Being is not made into Spirit (as with Hegel), but is considered
as an instance that cannot be grasped with the means of the
spirit. Each of these strategies lias led to an idea of thinking
that has profoundly influenced contemporary European
thought: various kinds of positivist or rationalontologies on
the one hand, and the ontology of transcendence on the other.
I mentioned earlier the idea of a complementary
phenomenon. On the one hand, there are the scientists,
functionalists and constructors who formulate their ideas
without an ontological claim; on the other hand, there are the
mystics, romantics and utopianists who consider a pragmatic
view of the world to be unsatisfactory and remain unswayed
by rational or logical means.
This realm, which cannot be defined ontologically, can
take a number of different names. It is the non-identical, the
absolutely other [tout autre], Being as transcendence, and so
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on. For Deleuze, however, this alternative realm belongs to
the same schema of thought that was described at the
beginning. It belongs to it insofar as it is its negative. The
situation begins to change only when immanent thinking
renounces its belief in oppositions and manages to grasp the
processes of difference and repetition which exist in a virtual
sense even before their representation. Deleuze operates with
an immanent philosophical ontology that differs from the
classical project of a metapf?ysica generalis, which was to define
being in essential and conceptual terms. It is precisely this
programme that makes his book Difference and Repetition such
an important event in the history of philosophy. Two unusual
conceptions surface at once: first, that the concept of Being
which is ungraspable by traditional conceptual means is not
defined as transcendence but as immanence24; and second,
that a totally different notion of the concept begins to emerge,
one that is able to think "being," albeit not in terms of
categorial generalities. It is perhaps easiest to explain Deleuze's
thinking of immanence from the angle of his concept of
difference. What is most important here is that difference
differentiates itself: it is not inscribed negatively into the
concept but occurs as a result oE "ontological" processes oE
becoming. With this philosophically conceived concept,
Deleuze refers to the immanence of being, understood
processually, without however monopolizing it, representing
it, or unifying it. This positive interpretation of the inner
brokenness of philosophical ontology defines Deleuze's
fundamental move. It is the novelty of this idea (anticipated
perhaps only by Nietzsche) that has led to many a
misunderstanding-or non-understanding-in readings of
Deleuze's philosophy.
For indeed: what is this so called differential process of
becoming if it is not an anonymous event that occurs behind
our backs, a naked life, a romantic chaos, another male fantasy?
These are some of the insinuations held against Deleuze that
are uttered in the name of a kind of "neoconservatism"25-
as if it sufficed to turn off one's reason, give up consciousness,
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and slip into the indifference of being. This kind of view may
suffice for a concept of indifference, but surely not for one
of difference. Ultimately, for Deleuze, the apparently opaque
concept of being dissolves into a multitude of differential
processes, singularities, and events. The concept of being that
suggests stability, unity, grounding, and order evaporates as
difference into the plurality of becoming. This becoming that
occurs immanently-in other words, that structures itself-
is for Deleuze nothing else than time. Thus the realm of
microphysics and floating quanta cannot be separated from
the immanent environment; it is not located somewhere
beyond the subject but on "this side of consciousness" (as
Hegel would say), as a process that is differential as much as
genetic, and which constitutes experience.
This brings us to the second point. Like Heidegger
before him, Deleuze posits a synthesis of time as the process
of subjectification that lies at the foundation of the subject.26
If the subject is not able to grasp these processes of time it is
because it is subordinate to them. "I think" cannot coincide
with "I am." In a way, it is as if Deleuze had transferred
Heidegger's late insights into his earlier interpretation of the
three syntheses which in I<.ant's Critique oj Pure Reason were
united as one whole experience. He thus succeeds in introducing
aseries of dissonances into the harmonious background music
of "representative thinking," which rests on the third synthesis
of recognition, as the highest synthesis which cancels out the
other two syntheses of apperception. Recognition means that
a subject identifies or re-identifies perceived phenomena on
the basis of pre-given conceptual possibilities. Against this
vision of harmonious collaboration, Deleuze defines the
communication of individual capacities by means of their
difference.27 Experience thus organizes itself Ihis side oj
consciousness and is actualized each time by a particular
subjectification effect, which depends for example on a
phenomenological body, and its threshold of perception and
affection. Thus, the following picture emerges: the immanent
structure of becoming-that is, dynamic connections between
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singular points-must necessarily pre-exist the actualization
results that progressively become conscious. But in fact this
order de iure is turned upside down: what is primarily given are
normal, daily acts of representation, the habitual world of
objects and things that surround us as more or less stable
individuals. Only in extreme situations (when thresholds of
consciousness are disrupted) or during sudden events (in the
course of overwhelming metamorphoses such as those
sometimes brought about by art)-only at such moments do
we beconle aware of the intensive and virtual regions of life.
It is not usually the result of sheer sensitivity but in the wake
of a catastrophe, as when we are swept away by an event,
overstimulated and defenceless-but also less sensationally,
in the density of lived life, where small but innumerable strings
of experience intersect and overlap.
Tinle places immanent structures into forms of
actualization that can be distinguished phenomenologically.
Unlike Heidegger, Deleuze connects the sensual realm, the
realm oE desire with the ontological status of temporality.
Time is not suspended in some vulgar outer dimension: it is
what throbs at the heart of our lives in passive, self-abandoned
syntheses. And precisely because it continues to flow
independently of its active synthesis (as in the form of
arbitrary memories), it corresponds to the differential use of
our abilities which cannot be regulated subjectively and
harmoniously. Our senses are therefore just as suited to
develop a perception of time that is appropriate to the various
speeds at which time passes, as thinking is suited to raise
immanence to the status of a concept. The being of
immanence, which could not be grasped by traditional
ontological means, thus expresses itself in the lower regions
of physical life, where it can be thought by a new kind of
thinking. In carrying out analytical reconstructions, Deleuze
by no means continues to follow the model of representation.
Rather, it is as a result of the definition of immanent structures
that the actual planes of given empirical relations begin to
become visible.
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We now arrive at the last point. I have emphasized how
immanence can be considered as a profane source of
experience that makes sense only in the context of temporal
subjectification processes. It does not therefore suffice to posit
a pure sensuality or a pure thinking of immanence. Our self
and worldly relations are always determined by relations of
power. But only on the basis of a scheme of immanent
thinking is it possible to really begin to see these determining
factors.28 Otherwise an en1pirical state of affairs-an empirical
normality-is hypostatized as a transcendental norm, in such
a way that its genetic background and conditions can be
considered mere byproducts and ignored. Thus, as long as it
is considered a foregone conclusion that a normal human
being has white skin, is of the male gender, middle aged,
belongs to a (particular) religion, and so on, then there is no
need to ask about the disciplining, sociological, political, and
economical processes in recent or past history that have given
rise to that person. From the perspective of immanence, what
can be located within power relations-in the sense of the
conditions of actualization of immanent structures-thus
seems naturally legitimate. Deleuze's philosophy of immanence
is therefore both political as weil as "absolute." Immanent
perceptions, sensations, and concepts are just as much
immediately determined by social conditions as are the
micrological regions of the political as immanent processes
of being. Against establis11ecl power structures that benefit
the rich to the detriment of the many, a kind of thinking
emerges that relies on immanence and is thereby qualified to
inquire into the implicit strategies that motivate all
representative forms of life production and empowerment.
Such a thirlking does not solely aim at unveiling the orders of
life that are otherwise presumed to be natural, but is directed
towards a model of free associations and free action.
Deleuze's temporal ontology of imn1anence thus reveals
itself as excluding dejure concentrations of power and thereby
making them comprehensible as facts with regard to their
causal conditions. It is therefore impossible to tacitly insert
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transcendence into the corresponding level of immanence,
where its power can be played out. It is impossible because
the structural characteristic of immanence is a constant
transport of difference, so that the syntheses of differential
singularities always refer to a particular actuality of immanent
structures-and according to Deleuze, it is only on this level
that densities and consolidations of power relations are
situated. By contrast, the postulates of transcendence, by
relying on natural orders and homologies, conceal the power-
drenched determination of forms of thinking and action.
Although in his early lectures on I<ant, Heidegger drew on
the dimension of time to expand critical philosophy-and in
this regard he was a source of inspiration for Deleuze-his
orientation towards the origin of imagination as a medium
between understanding and contemplation testifies to a certain
natural accordance which in fact renders superfluous any
profound analysis of conditioning power relations.
Central to Heidegger's discourse is an act of
transcendence which assigns the level oE temporal immanence
to a self-identical Dasein which overcomes itself.
The same problem can be identified in the context of
the critique of onto-theology. Here the difficulty has to do
with the presumed philosophical "unity" ofbeing and thinking
which, according to Heidegger, pre-exists any active or
spontaneous activity of thinking and is but the task of thinking
to heed.29
In this regard Deleuze can be seen to playoff Nietzsche
against Heidegger. For while Nietzsche, with the "will to
power," presents a concept of immanence that leaves modern
nihilism behind because it radically questions the value of value,
Heidegger, in his criticism of Nietzsche, relies on the "proper"
(eigentliche) value of a dedicated "experience of being"
(5einserfahrun~ which backs away from the escalating nihilism
of the times. Insofar as Heidegger, faced with the decay of
modernity, holds on to a thinking of transcendence, his
diagnosis of the present thus remains stuck in resentment.
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For instead of taking fate (Geschick) into our own hands, we
are to let fate follow its course and obey the order that comes
from the highest ruler: Being itself.
Universiry of Darmstadt
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